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In the present study, vulnerability and security risk of a combined cycle power plant using Security 
Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) technique in a computer aided software has been estimated. In general, 
17 assets were identified in the under study facility of which 13 assets with high and extreme risk 
priority through Security Risk Factor Table (SRFT) were determined. These 13 assets for further 
analysis on vulnerability and possible threats were entered into the software Joshan-Pro. Subject matter 
experts used to score threat, consequence and vulnerability for each asset, qualitatively. For each asset, 
associated checklists within the software helped the participant experts with safety, security, process, 
management, IT, maintenance, etc. experience and knowledge to determine vulnerability and other 
security risk factors. Therefore, security risk for each asset by multiplying threat, consequence and 
vulnerability scores was calculated and to reduce the risks and vulnerabilities, countermeasures were 
proposed.  
Keywords: Security risk; Security Vulnerability Assessment; Power plant 
1.   Introduction 
The philosophy behind the creation of every organization or facility is bound up with the 
objectives for each it has been created. There are always factors threatening the continuation of the 
organization’s activities or even its existence. Some of these factors involve common threats in the 
field of security and deliberate incidents. Unfortunately, war, terrorism, theft and vandalism are the 
bitter realities of human life and today world. Prior to 11 September 2001 attack in USA, the risk 
assessment in the industries was based on assessment and evaluation of unintentional incidents due 
to human errors, technical failures or natural disasters while the human intelligence to occurring 
deliberate sabotages was ignored. The 9/11 terrorist attack, mainly has changed this perspective 
(Bajpai and Gupta, 2007; Reniers et al., 2008, 2013; van Staalduinen et al., 2016).  
Infrastructures and critical facilities such as governmental organizations, airports, military bases, 
power plants and oil & gas industries due to their importance and significant roles which playing 
in many aspects of country’s consistency such as economy, politics, psychology, health and 
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welfare are the attractive targets to terrorists, criminals and saboteurs. Therefore, it is imperative 
that these undesired threats through a systematic security risk management process should be 
identified, their associated risks should be assessed and appropriate security countermeasures and 
emergency response must be devoted to reduce the risks and vulnerabilities (Akgun et al., 2010; 
Bajpai et al., 2007 & 2010). Many studies have been conducted with regards to the security and 
vulnerability analysis in infrastructures and critical facilities. Among them, Moore (2004), 
explained a new pattern of security risk management for chemical industries which investigates the 
differences in the interpretation of the security risk against the risk of process accidents and the 
challenges ahead. Bajpai and Gupta (2005) argue that from methodology point of view, security 
risk assessment is necessary for process industries, including the threat assessment, vulnerability 
assessment, security measures and emergency response in emergency situations. The study 
revealed that the most serious terrorist threats are directed towards chemical transportation system 
(road, rail, ships, pipelines, etc.). Reniers et al. (2008) a theoretical approach to manage 
intentionally induced domino effects in a complex industrial cluster have introduced. Srivastava 
and Gupta (2010) presented a new model for evaluating security risk in the oil and gas and other 
process industries that includes both the idea of a Security Risk Factor Table (SRFT) and a 
Stepped Matrix Procedure (SMP). Researchers also highlighted the need for announcing the news 
and information related to terrorist threats. Using a Delphi technique, Esmaeeli Shahrokht and 
Taghvayee (2011) presented a method for assessment of city vulnerability and influencing security 
issues. Yazdani et al. (2012) introduced a developed framework to overcome the limitations of 
traditional methods of security risk assessment for vital facilities. The introduced framework 
develops the RAMCAP through the introduction of new parameters that affect the rate of the risk. 
In another study, Jamshidi et al. (2012) introduced the software Joshan-Pro to assess the security 
vulnerability caused by man-made incidents in southern oil islands in the Middle East. Van 
Staalduinen et al. (2016) a security vulnerability assessment, prevention and prediction (SVAPP) 
model proposed. The authors adapted safety barriers approach to security facet and a probabilistic 
security attack barrier approach through Bayesian updating technique to reduce the uncertainty in 
the proposed model. 
The current study conducted in a combined cycle thermal power plant. Power plants producing 
electrical energy considered as infrastructures in every country; so that it is required to be 
evaluated in terms of security issues and adverse man-made events. Appropriate measures also 
must be taken into account to reduce the vulnerabilities and security risks in such these facilities. 
SVA technique was used to estimate vulnerability and security risk of the critical assets in the 
under study facility. Section 2 describes the security risk management, its definition and process. 
Furthermore available security risk assessment techniques, as well as theirs pros and cons 
mentioned. Section 3, explores SVA technique and its process and steps. Section 4, represents 
software Joshan-Pro and its application to accomplish SVA. Section 5 has been devoted to initial 
screening of the identified assets. Section 6 expresses types of threats in a thermal power plants. 
The results being discussed in Section 7. Conclusions are provided in Section 8. 
2.   Security risk assessment 
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A security risk is defined as ‘‘the likelihood that a defined threat will exploit a specific 
vulnerability of a particular attractive target or combination of targets to cause a given set of 
consequences’’ (CCPS, 2010; Reniers et al., 2008).   
Indeed, American Petroleum Institute (API) defines security risk as “a function of consequences of 
a successful attack against an asset and likelihood of a successful attack against that asset”. It also, 
expresses “Likelihood is a function of the attractiveness to the adversary of the asset, the degree 
threat of posed by the adversary and the degree of vulnerability of the asset” .Thus, to determine 
security risk for every asset in the facilities, the likelihood, consequence, attractiveness, threat and 
vulnerability of each asset in case of security issues should be determined (API/NPRA, 2003). 
Several security risk analysis techniques/tools have been developed. Some most important of 
which are security vulnerability assessment (SVA) (API/NPRA, 2003; API, 2005), Risk Analysis 
Methodology for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) (Al Mannai, 2008; Moore, 2007; Nickell, 
2004), Critical Accessibility Recoverability Vulnerability Espy ability Redundancy (CARVER) 
(Al Mannai, 2008), Maritime Security Risk Assessment Methodology(MSRAM) (Al Mannai, 
2008; Downs, 2007), Transit Risk Assessment Methodology (TRAM) (Al Mannai, 2008) and 
Model-Based Risk Assessment (MBRA) (Al Mannai, 2008; Lewis et al., 2006). Each tool has its 
respective strengths and weaknesses. (Al Mannai, 2008) has described capabilities and disabilities 
of every each of outlined tools which is listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Comparison of security risk analysis techniques (Al Mannai, 2008)  
Factors   
Tools 
  
RAMCAP CARVER MSRAM TRAM MBRA 
Generality All sectors All sectors Ports Transportation All sectors 
Network model Asset level Asset level Asset level Asset level Network 
Risk calculation No No Yes Yes Yes 
Resource allocation No No 
No, 
asset level 
No, 
asset level 
Yes, 
network level 
Repeatable No No No No Yes 
 
Based on Al Mannai key factors of the mentioned tools having explained as following: 
• Generality refers to the tool’s ability to assess infrastructure in any of the sectors, not just one 
or two specific ones.  
• Network model refers to the tool’s ability to consider the network attributes of a sector.  
• Risk calculation refers to whether or not the tool calculates risk using the approved security 
risk equation.  
• Resource allocation refers to whether or not the tool is able to directly inform the allocation of 
resources to the assets.  
• Repeatable refers to whether or not two analysts using the same descriptive data will come up 
with the same result (Al Mannai, 2008).  
3.   Security vulnerability assessment (SVA) 
Security vulnerability is defined as any weakness or deficiency that can be exploited by terrorists 
or criminals to damage to the assets. Vulnerabilities not only included the building characteristics 
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or equipment properties which are known as assets generally but also comprises personnel 
behavior, locations of people or operational and personnel activities (CCPS, 2010). On the other 
hand, (Reniers et al. 2015) categorizes assets as: people, property and infrastructure, reputation and 
information. Thus, asset refers to the vast range of resources in an organization/facility which has 
to be protected against undesired deliberate incidents. However, security vulnerability assessment 
of infrastructures is a challenging issue because such facilities are complex in terms of topology 
and function (Akgun, 2010). Nevertheless, SVA is considered as the significant and preliminary 
step versus deliberate acts in the security risk management process (API/NPRA, 2003; Garrick et 
al., 2004; Sarewitz et al., 2003). 
SVA is a systematic and integrated approach to identify deliberate man-made threats, assess 
vulnerabilities of the assets and determine the likelihood and consequences of these types of 
adverse events (API, 2005; Reniers et al. 2015). It is not necessarily a quantitative method but 
qualitative methods such as subject matter experts who provide estimates on the attributes for each 
asset to rank vulnerabilities can be used (API/NPRA, 2003; Bajpai et al., 2005 & 2010). 
Depending on the type and size of the facility, the SVA team may include experts with knowledge, 
experience and expertise of physical and cyber security, process safety, process design and 
operations, emergency response, management and etc. in understanding how and where the 
security risks may appear and what are the countermeasure to combat them (API/NPRA, 2003; 
CCPS, 2010). The SVA methodology used in the present study has been adapted from 
(API/NPRA, 2003) having shown in Fig. 1. 
Fig. 1: API/NPRA Security Vulnerability Assessment (API/NPRA, 2003; CCPS, 2010)  
A SVA process consists of main steps which are described briefly as following: 
3.1.   Asset characterization 
At the first step, all assets in terms of security and deliberate concerns should be identified and 
characterized. SVA team do this. These assets include process, equipment, operations, personnel, 
information, process control systems and support utilities (API/NPRA, 2003; Bajpai et al., 2010; 
Moore, 2004). Indeed value and importance of every asset, as well as, the relevance and 
interdependency of these assets to the public, suppliers, customers and other stakeholders has to be 
Determining Asset & Specifications
Assessing Threats
Vulnerability Assessment
Security Risk Assessment
Countermeasures Analysis
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characterized and based on the worst possible incident, intentional adversaries and malicious 
security events on assets should be determined (CCPS, 2010).  
3.2.   Threat assessment 
Threat assessment is an important part of the security management process and is used to evaluate 
the likelihood of malicious actions, threat capabilities, adversary strength, motives, weapons and 
tactics against a given asset or group of assets (API/NPRA, 2003; Reniers et al. 2013).  In this part, 
both internal and external threats against assets and attractiveness of each asset in terms of security 
issues are identified and characterized (API/NPRA, 2003; Reniers et al. 2013 & 2015). Moreover, 
type of threats including physical, financial, cyber or psychological threats which might impose 
damages and result in casualties to the assets should be analyzed. Adversary characterization 
involves adversary’s history, capabilities and intention (API/NPRA, 2003).  
3.3.   Vulnerability assessment 
In this step, potential security vulnerabilities that threaten the assets are identified and evaluated. 
This part consists of three following subparts: 
3.3.1.   Define scenarios and evaluate specific consequences 
After that SVA team determined how an adverse security event can be induced, it should 
determine how adversary could accomplish that undesired action and what is the consequences and 
damages of a successful adverse action (API/NPRA, 2003).   
3.3.2.   Evaluate effectiveness of existing security measures 
The SVA team review and assess the existing countermeasures intended to protect the facility 
assets in the perspective of their effectiveness, integrity, reliability and ability to deter, detect and 
delay malicious security attacks and reducing the vulnerabilities of each asset to each threat or 
adversary (API/NPRA, 2003).  
3.3.3.   Identify vulnerabilities and estimate degree of vulnerability 
The SVA team estimates the vulnerabilities of each asset through the provided vulnerability 
assessment checklists. The SVA team should brainstorm vulnerabilities for all of the deliberate 
acts and threat types that are possible at a minimum (API/NPRA, 2003).   
3.4.   Security risk assessment 
To establish an understanding of security risk, scenarios can be assessed in terms of the severity of 
outcomes and the likelihood of occurrence of security incidents. These are qualitative analyses 
based on the expert’s judgment and deliberation of knowledgeable team members. 
Recommendations should be justified to reduce the risks (API/NPRA, 2003).   
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3.5.   Recommend countermeasures 
Finally, risk mitigation options should be identified and evaluated cost-effectively. After 
implementation of countermeasures, security and vulnerability of assets should be re-assessed to 
be ensured adequate and effective countermeasures are being applied (API/NPRA, 2003; Bajpai et 
al., 2010; Moore, 2004).   
4.   The software Joshan-Pro  
The local version of the software SVA-Pro called Joshan-Pro was used to assess vulnerability of 
the assets in the under study facility. In this software, the vulnerability of assets is analyzed 
through security considerations which have been collected from the diversified checklists. These 
checklists are consisted hazardous materials, process equipment, communication and electrical 
equipment, information technology procedures and equipment, buildings, water and wastewater 
facilities checklists and etc.  Therefore, all risk factors that affect assets critically, are ranked from 
0 (lowest) to 5 (highest) point. This ranking is based on the expert’s judgment. As a result, in order 
to calculate the security risk in the SVA technique, Eq. (1) is used: 
 
	
 =  ×  ×                                                                                                            (1)                                 
 
Where; T is the rating of threats, V is the vulnerability and C is the consequence of each threat. 
Finally, to reduce the vulnerability and security risks in the assets, countermeasures are offered.  
5.   Initial screening 
Prior launching a SVA, an initial screening at a system level/asset level should be done. The 
screening can be used to review the facility/asset to determine whether further security analysis 
and detailed threat and vulnerability assessment is required or not (API, 2005). Security Risk 
Factor Table (SRFT) used to evaluate the identified assets in terms of security risk. In SRFT, 
important factors aﬀecting security risk such as location, visibility, access control, presence of 
chemicals, etc. are listed. Other factors are represented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Security Risk Factor Table (SRFT) presented by Bajpai and Gupta (2005) 
Actual 
points Range of security points  Risk factors  
  
Presence 
5 
Absence  
0 
Presence of chemicals which can be 
used as precursors for WMD 
 
High density  
5  
Urban  
2,3,4  
Rural  
1 
Location  
  
Government  
4,5  
Public  
2,3  
Private 
1  
Ownership 
 
Frequent  
4,5  
Few 
1,2,3  
Nil 
0  History of security incidents 
 
Largo no.  
4,5 
Few 
1,2,3 
Absence 
0 Presence of terrorist group in region 
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Poor  
4,5  
Average 
2,3  
Well prepared 
1  
Personal preparedness and training 
 
Table 2. Security Risk Factor Table (SRFT) presented by Bajpai and Gupta (2005) (Continued)  
Actual 
points 
Range of security points  Risk factors  
 Poor/None Ordinary High level Existing security measure: 
 4,5 2,3 1 Access control 
 4,5 2,3 1 Perimeter protection 
 4,5 2,3 1 Mitigation potential 
 4,5 2,3 1 Proper lighting 
 4,5 2,3 1 Using metal detector /X-ray/CCTV 
 
High 
5 
Medium 
3,4 
Low 
1,2 
Not Visible 
0 Visibility 
 
Very large 
5 
large 
3,4 
Medium 
2 
Low 
1 
Inventory 
 
Severe 
5 
Moderate 
2,3,4 
Low 
1 
Negligible 
0 Worst case impact on-site 
 
Severe 
5 
Moderate 
2,3,4 
Low 
1 
Negligible 
0 Worst case impact off-site 
 
  
Total Actual Risk Score 
  
 
 
For each asset, safety and security experts estimate the security risk by scoring the asset a number 
from 0 (lowest risk) to 5 (highest risk). Finally, numbers related to diﬀerent factors are then added 
into a single risk score (Bajpai and Gupta, 2005; Rivera et al., 2014). Based on the value of the risk 
score, the identified assets classified in low, moderate, high, extreme risk according to the Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Security Risk Factor Score Ranking 
Risk Ranking Security Risk Factor Score  
Low  15<  
Moderate  16-29  
High  30-39  
Extreme  40>  
 
The minimum security risk factor score to enter each asset into Joshan-Pro for further is 30 and 
therefore, among 17 identified assets, 13 assets with high and extreme risk were entered Joshan-
Pro. Table 4 lists identified assets, their security risk factor scores and their ranking of risks. 
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Table 4. Determining the analysis priority for the assets under study 
Assets Security Risk Factor Score Risk Ranking 
Land and power plant area 23 Moderate 
Industrial building 33 High 
Office building 38 High 
Storage building 23 Moderate 
4-Gas oil storage tanks 36 High 
Natural gas station 30 High 
Accessories 28 Moderate 
230 kV Substation 33 High 
Refinery unit 29 Moderate 
Gas turbine transformer 33 High 
Steam turbine transformer 33 High 
Gas turbine control room 42 Extreme 
Steam turbine control room 42 Extreme 
Natural gas fueled turbine 40 Extreme 
Gas oil fueled turbine 38 High 
Steam turbine 34 High 
Steam Boilers 32 High 
 
6.   Types of threats in thermal power plants 
Some of the possible security threats for the facilities under study are as follows: Air strikes, 
terrorist attacks, bombing facilities with electromagnetic and graphite bombs, cyber-attacks, 
protests and riots by the disgruntled employees and contractors and stealing equipment, tools, 
materials and information of which each of these threats has at least one history record in the 
facilities under study or similar facilities (Garrick et al., 2004). Possible scenarios, security 
incidents, consequences, threats and vulnerability for each of the assets in the under study facility 
have been represented in Table 5. 
By multiplying the threat, consequence and vulnerability scores, security risk for each of the assets 
is estimated. Considering the fact that the highest imaginable number for each of the threat, 
consequence, and vulnerability is 5, the highest possible security risk is 5×5×5=125 and the 
security risk for each of the assets is calculated as a fraction of 125. In Table 6, the vulnerability 
and security risk for each of the selected assets has been shown. 
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Table 5. The assessment of scenarios, security incidents, consequences and assets vulnerability of under study facility 
Assets Scenarios Type of  Security Incident Consequences 
Type of 
Threats 
Vulnerability 
Industrial 
building Airstrike Missile impact 
Explosion-fire-power cut-
disruption in  organization 
management 
Airstrike 1.45 
Office 
building 
Terrorist 
attack 
Infiltration of 
malwares into the 
office server 
Disruption in management  
and correspondence of the 
organization 
Cyber attack 1.8 
Gas oil 
storage tanks 
Military attack 
or terrorist 
attack 
Airstrike and 
missile attack 
Explosion and fire and 
environmental pollution 
Airstrike 2.33 
Natural gas 
station 
Terrorist 
attack 
Planting bombs Explosion and fire in 
pipelines and gas station 
Terrorist 
attack 
1.54 
230 kV 
substation 
Theft, terrorist 
attack or 
graphite 
bombardment 
Arching, broken 
insulators 
Nationwide power cut 
Terrorist 
attacks, 
bombardment 
0.96 
Gas turbine 
transformer 
Graphite 
bombardment 
Terrorist sabotage-
power cut No electricity production 
Bombardmen, 
disgruntled 
employees 
and 
contractors 
1.15 
Steam 
turbine 
transformer 
Graphite 
Bombardment
-terrorist 
attack 
Terrorist sabotage-
technical problems 
Causing problems in the 
process of electricity 
production 
Disgruntled 
employees 
and 
contractors 
1.35 
Gas turbine 
control room 
Severe 
terrorist attack 
, Cyber attack 
Planting bombs-
sabotage and 
technical problems, 
Infecting control 
systems with 
malwares 
Disruption in the process of 
control rooms operation-no 
production of electricity 
Terrorist 
attack, Cyber 
attack 
1.04 
Steam 
turbine 
control room 
Severe 
terrorist 
attack, Cyber 
attack 
Planting bombs-
sabotage and 
technical problems, 
Infecting control 
systems with 
malware s 
Disruption in the process of 
control rooms operation-no 
production of electricity 
Terrorist 
attack, Cyber 
attack 
0.94 
Natural gas 
fueled 
turbine 
Terrorist 
attack 
Planting bombs or 
causing technical 
problem in turbine 
system 
Causing disruption in the 
process of electricity 
production 
Terrorist 
attack 
1.34 
Gas oil 
fueled 
turbine 
Terrorist 
attack 
Planting bombs or 
causing technical 
problem in turbine 
system 
Causing disruption in the 
process of electricity 
production 
Terrorist 
attack 
1.07 
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Table 5. The assessment of scenarios, security incidents, consequences and assets vulnerability of under study facility 
 (Continued) 
 
Table 6. Vulnerability and security risk for each of the assets 
Assets Threat Ranking Consequence Vulnerability Security risk 
Industrial building 5 5 1.45 36.25 
Office building 3 4 1.8 21.60 
Gas oil storage tanks 4 5 2.33 46.60 
Natural gas station 3 3 1.54 13.86 
230 kV Substation 3 3 0.96 8.64 
Gas turbine transformer 4 3 1.15 13.80 
Steam turbine transformer 4 3 1.35 16.20 
Gas turbine control room 4 4 1.04 16.64 
Steam turbine control room 4 3 0.94 11.28 
Natural gas fueled turbine 4 4 1.34 21.44 
Gas oil fueled turbine 4 3 1.07 12.84 
Steam turbine 4 3 1.19 14.28 
Steam boilers 3 5 0.95 14.25 
 
7.   Results and discussion 
In the under study facility 17 assets were identified and entered into security risk factor table 
(SRFT) for screening and among them, 13 assets with extreme and high security risk were 
determined and entered the software Joshan-Pro for further analysis. Gas oil storage tanks with the 
vulnerability of 2.33 out of five and security risk of 46.60 out of 125 is ranked as the highest in 
terms of security risk and if they stop operating, they cause the highest economic damage to the 
under study power plant. The reason is the high volume of hydrocarbons including gas oil fuel in 4 
tanks containing 117 million liters. Next, industrial buildings (warehouse and facility holds), office 
building and natural gas fueled turbine are ranked in terms of security risk, respectively. The 230 
KV substation with the vulnerability of 0.96 and security risk of 8.64 was identified as the asset 
with the lowest security risk ranking. To reduce the security vulnerability of the assets in the under 
study facility, defensive countermeasure such as camouflage, concealment, covering and 
construction of parapet and explosion-proof structures for some sensitive installations such as 
Steam 
turbine 
Terrorist 
attack 
Planting bombs or 
causing technical 
problems 
Disruption in the process of 
electricity production 
Terrorist 
attack 
1.19 
Steam 
boilers Airstrike 
Bombardment and 
missile attack on the 
boilers 
The explosion of boilers and 
creating holes in them 
Airstrike 0.95 
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transformers are proposed. The cables to not be detected by criminals, should be buried. For 
storage tanks operating in war conditions, the camouflage painting must be used. Modern methods 
of cyber protection should be deployed in depth to deny access of terrorists to the key information. 
Access control and monitoring system for the entry and exit of people and vehicles into and out of 
the facility through regular and non-regular inspections must be strengthened. Lighting system in 
the entire facility using a CCTV should be Strengthened and improved and the total facility area 
must be monitored at all hours of the day. It is also essential that special attention must be paid to 
the cyber security and its importance in the prevention of physical injuries and calamities to the 
power plant equipment and facilities. Also, in response programs under emergency situations, 
security scenarios should be taken into account and through periodic and regular maneuvers and 
proving integrated training course, the personnel’s preparation to encounter such conditions should 
be increased. 
8.   Conclusion 
Energy section is one of the most important section that has been threated around the world in 
various ways. Any long interval in supplying one of the basic types of energy such as electricity, 
oil or natural gas can cause remarkable damage to the economy of the society and the people. In 
the present study, the vulnerability and security risk of critical assets in a thermal power plant 
using SVA technique were determined. Among 17 identified assets in the facility, 13 assets with 
high and extreme risk priority through Security Risk Factor Table (SRFT) were determined and for 
further analysis on vulnerability and possible threats were entered into the software Joshan-Pro. 
Subject matter experts used to score threat, consequence and vulnerability for each asset, 
qualitatively. For each asset, associated checklists within the software helped the participant 
experts with safety, security, process, management, IT, maintenance, etc. experience and 
knowledge to determine vulnerability and other security risk factors. Therefore, security risk for 
each asset by multiplying threat, consequence and vulnerability scores was calculated and to 
reduce the risks and vulnerabilities, countermeasures were proposed. The suggested further 
research can be performed on the quantitative evaluation of the vulnerabilities and security risks in 
the thermal and nuclear power plants as the critical facilities in perspective of both physical and 
cyber security issues.  
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